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J. H. EHLERS, EVELYN P. BOYCE,
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a

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, BOYCE and CORNELL.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE.

Appellant appeals from a judgment denying him loss of
benefit damages, but, granting him out of pocket damages,
based on alleged breach of real estate sales contract, where
seller was unable to pass title through no fault of their own,
under contract to convey by special warranty deed only.

DISPOSITION OF T-iL CAS1? IN THE LOWER COURT:

At tue trial of the cross-complainant*s case, on January
16th, 1976, to the Court, Honorable James S. Sawaya, sitting without a jury, judgment was rendered against appellant on claim of

page ?.

damages for loss-of-bargain amounts, and, against cross-complainants claim for attorneys1 fee allowance, and costs; but, was
awarded out-of-pocket damages for amounts paid under tne contract.
STATK.ET3T 0F_FAUTSi
Supplementing appellant1 s statement _f facts /pages ?-4jf
appellant1? brief, there are some items affecting these respondents
and their position in the matter, not stated by aDpellant, or,
where incorrect conclusions of testimony are taken. Respondents,
Boyce and Connell entered into a conditional r^al estate contract
for tne sale of their interests in the real estate herein involved,
said property being situate in Salt Lake Courty, Utah, under date
of August 20th, 1972. Warr, the purchaser, had seen the property
before buying, and was cognizant of its condition /Tr. 53, Rec. ?7j£
The contract witn these respondents ^Exhibit SS/as sellers, provide
among other tnings, that upon full payment title was to be passed I
a special warranty deed, prior to tne signing of x:.e contract, a
title ooinion snow in*/ good title in tne respondents /Exnibit 4l"7,
was obtained.

Respondents nor their representative were not shown

to have visited the property or inspected tne sai.e at any time.
Several months after tne signing of the contracts, an action to
quiet title against respondents-defendants in tnis action was irstituted by the olaintiffs.

Trial upon the issues relating to the

title was had, and title quieted against the defendants-respondents
herein. No demand was ever made by cross-complaint Warr upon the
respondents and cross-defendants Boyce and Connell to undertake defense action for Warr, TRec. 276, 275, Tr. 5b and 52ji tout only upo
Mr. Milton Backman.

Trial on cross-complaint resulted in findings

for these respondents on the matter of damages, except for requirement of refunding amounts paid on the contract prior to quiet title

*age 3

title action determination herein, the damages allowed being on the
out of socket rule or basis, rather thai, on the loss-of-bargain rule
contended for by cross-complainant#
POINT I -- COVIINAINT OF SPECIAL WARRANT*1 GOV IS (A) vICLY A"AIIT5T
CLAIMS ARISIMG UND^R, BY, OR THROUGH AC'iS 0! SELLER
OR GRALTOR, ATiD DOES NOT TTARR'u.T GEL I ^LLY AGAINS1
ACTS OF A L L P E R S U N S , and (B) PUrlS VENDEE ON NCT1CE
OR UPON INQUIRY AS TO ADVERSE CLAIMS.
(A)

Since here, trie respondents Bo^ce and Connell, covenanted

to convey, unon full payment, by special warranty deed, they were not
liable for any damages on the loss of benefit or bargain theory, when
their inability to convey was taken from tnem from or by a superior
title holder, (See Sbcti:n 53, Covenants, 20 Am. Jur. 2nd, page 624,
where it is stated:
H

A cjve'ifunt of special warranty is one the operation
of which is restricted to certain persons or claims.
As a general rule, where a vendee receives a special
warranty, or quitclaim conveyance, he tatces the estate
subject to all the disadvantages that it was liable to
in the hands of the vendor
and hence protects the grantee against a claim under
a title from, but not against a claim under a title
against, or superior to, his grantor/1
See also,ffhaynev.tacBirney,257 Pac. 2nd 151, 195 Oklahoma
269, and Central Life Assurance Co. vs Impelmans, 126 Pacific 2nd
7o7, 13 Wash. 2nd 631.
(B) Vendee is put on notice of possible claims by the existence
or inclusion of the special warranty clause in his deed or contract,
see 20 Am. Jur. 2nd, page 624, Section cjb, Covenants, wnich states:
"The fact that a vendor refuses to make a full and
complete assurance of title is said to be sufficient to
excite suspicion and put the /othe£7party upon inquiry."
See also, Jones vs Arthur, 244 S. //• 2nd 469 (Ky.) at page 471,
Burton vs Price, 141 Southern 728 (Florida), McAbo^ vs Packer,
187 S. W. 2nd 207 (Mo.}, Kentucky River Coal, Cort). vs Swift Coal
and Timber Co., 299 S. W. 201 (Ky.);
Where, as h~re, the purchaser was out on notice of possible
defects in the title, and thus cannot, especially as stated, th^eunoi
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claim the benefits of the rule of damages on the loss of benfits
basis, due to the limitations on vendors liability.
POINT II -- KL:GL1GE:-JC.:: A ^ bASIS FbR FINDING OF "B,VD FAllHff lb
NOT A PROPER RULE OF LAT JUST I FY I KG AN AV7AHD OF
DA^GE ON LOSS OF BENEFIT THEORY.
Appellant cites and quotes from a lone c- se of Shaw vs. Union
Escrow & Realty Company, 53 Cal. App. 66, POO rec.

Pb, ?6, as a basis

for justifying loss of benefits damages, by assuming that negligence
equates with bad faith, and thus, whichever rule of damages is determined to prevail in Utah, makes respondents here liable for loss of ben
efits.

The case in question was appealed to the California Supreme

Court, which awarded and affirmed the damages on a bad faith basis,
but which commented on the Court of Appeals reliance on negligence
as equaling bed faith, as follows:
"OPINION OF SITPREI/.E COURT IN BANK/DRYING HEARING"
/?J0 Pacific (C*il.) p. ??7
"PER CURIAM. f]kj The application for a Hearing in this
Court after decision by the District Court of Appeal of the
Second District, Division 1, is denied.
"We are not prepared to accede to the unqualified statement that gross negligence is the equivalent of bad faith as
used in Section 3306 of the Civil Code. In this case, however,
the court below made a finding:
'That the defendant acted in bad faith in refusing
to carry out its contract with plaintiff and to convey said property to plaintiff on August 14, 1919,
and in naving conveyed said property to R# M . Goodman on June 21, 1919, without making in said conveyance provisions for the protection of plaintiff's
rights in said property secured to him under the
contract of June b9 1919.f
Upon looking into the evidence in the case we are satisfied that there was sufficient therein to justify the trial court
in finding that the conduct of the defendants in so refusing
to perform its contract with plaintiff amounted to bad faith
within the meaning of that terra as used in said section 3306.*
It would appear that the portion of the case quoted and relied
unon by appellant here, and unsupported by any other authority, is
probably mere dicta, and lacks any basis for such theory bases on
the ruling of trie higher Supreme Court's decision.

Page b.
Ironically, the same case quoted and relied upon above, quotes
Section 3306 of the California Civil Code, which adopts the same
rule of out-of-pocket expenses or damages being recoverable (rather
than loss-of-bargain damages) where good faith exists when vendor*s
inability to convey occurs, viz.:
"The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to
conv.y an estate in real property, is deemed to be the
price paid, and the expenses properly incurred in examining the title andpreparing the necessary papers, with
interest thereon; but adding thereto, in case of bad
faith, the difference between/ff^e^WMae paid and the
value of the estate agreed to be conveyed at the time
of the breach, and the expenses properly incurred in
preparing to enter upon the land.* Id. page 26.
POINT III -- UTAH CASES DECIDED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT
TO CONVEY REALTY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
RULE THAT BAD FAITH BREACHES ALLOW RECOVERABLE DAMAGES ON BASIS OF LOSS OF BARGAIN
RULE.
Utah cases involving breach of contract to convey realty situations are consistent with the rule that where bad faith is the
cause of trie breach by vendor, that the loss-of-bargain rule of
damages anplies. From Dunshee vs. Geoghegan, 7 Utah 11?, where the
measure of damages was based on the fact that seller had no- title
whatsoever at the sale date, and thus used the difference between the
contract price and the value at the time set for conveyance was the
measure of damages; McBride vs. Stewart, 249 pac. 114 (Utah) where
buyer sued for and was allowed to recover his payments, Brown vs.
Cleverly, 70 Pacific 2nd 882, where buyer was allowed to rescind and
recover his payments, McKellar R. E. & I. Co. vs paxton, 62 Utah 97,
where the buyer was given right to recover damages for failure of vendor to complete a building contracted for, and Bunnell vs. Bills, 13
Utah 2nd83, 368 pac. 2nd t>97, where the underhandness of the seller
in selling to a second buyer without regard to t..e rights of a prior
bu yer, likewise involves a "bad faith" situation* and the rule an-
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nounced therein by tne Court, while correct on that basis, does not
go in to the question of "good" and "bad* faith situations.
POIM IV —

UTiu. STATU'IE PRtVIDL G FOR ADOPI10. OF ^l&xh I A//
^GOiwPASSED ADOPTluN Of 30-CxJLED "SI GLISH fcULE*
RELATING Tu XAaUR : 0? DMIAGEb IK GOOD A? D ^J)
FAITH SITUAlKuS.

Section 65-3-1, Utah Code Aan ^ t t d> 19L3, reads as follows:
ff
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant
to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or laws of the
Unites States, or rne Constitution or laws of this state,
and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to
the natural and physical conditions of t,iis state and the
necessitios of the peoDle hereof, is hereby adonted ano
shall be uade the rule of decision in this state.ff
Statutorily regulated matters are impliedly excluded, Rio
Grande Western Ry. Co. vs Salt Lake Investment Co•, 35 Utah 528,
101 pacific 586. This section does not adopt rigor or harshness
of the common law, but only so much as was and had been generally
recognized in this country, and as is and was, suitable to our conditions, Hatch vs. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 Pac. 1096, Canoon vs.
Pelton, 9 Utah 2nd 224, 342 Pac. 2nd 94.
AS far back as 1843, Sugden Qfi Vendors, Volu e ?, Page 332,
(6tn American from lOtn London Edition) stated the fact to be
that:
w

. . even if he /TendeeT affirms the agreement by bringing an action for non-performance of it, he will obtain nominal damages only for the loss of his bargain, because a purchaser is not entitlec to any corroensation for the fancied
goodness of his bargain, which ne may supoose he has lost
where the vendor is without fraud, incapable of making a
title.11
While there is some diversity among the American States in the
matter, we feel the rule cited in Section 522, Am. Jnr. 651, Title,
Vendor and Purchaser Volume 77, 2nd series, should prevail, and be
thus included in our law, to-wit:
" S e c t i o n b22. E i f e c t of Vearitarf,a Good F a i t h .
•'In many j u r i s d i c t i o n s , when t h e vendor i s unable to
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convey, a distinction is made regarding the general damages
recoverable by trie purchaser under a land contract, between
cases where the vendor acts in good faith in entering into
the contract, and those in which good faith is wanting. While
it is generally recognized th'dt the purcnaseer is entitled to
recover the difference between tne value of the land and the
agreed price, to recover for the loss of his bargain, where
the vendor cannot be said to have acted in good faith, it is
held by many courts, in cases where the vendor does act in
good faitn, that the measure of damages is the amount of the
purchase money paid, with interest, thereby denying the^purchaser any recovery for the loss of his bargain. The situation is analagous to one where a recovery is sought for breach
of a covenant of warranty orfor quiet enjoyment in an conveyance
and should be governed by the same rule.
Since, in effect Utah has been following the rule to the extent
of allowing "bad-faith" vendors to be penalized, it should recognize
the fact that a good faith vendor should only have to respond by
returning any amounts paid, or costs directly relating to the making of the contract.
POINT V — AMOUNT CF PURCHASE PRICE REFUNDABLE WHILE ERRONEOUS
~
WAS DUE TO MISINFORMATION FURNISHED BY CCUNSIX FOR
Ai5PTriLLAKT TO COUNSEL FuR RESPONDENTS.
in putting final touches on the proposec judgment, later signed
into effect by the Court, Mr. David Boyce requested payment figures
on amounts paid these respondents on the contract of sale, and the
telphoixic response made to a secretary in his office was as follows:
"David—Mr. 7/e£terbyfs office called. Total of
checks from Ron //arr to L. A. Boyce, was $3,bU7.?5.
Didnot include checks toEhlers." 3-17~f76 (©:45A.M.
This amount was therefore inserted in the judgment, and, became
fixed upon the signing of the same by the Court.

Such principal am-

ount was fully paid to Ron Warr and Joseph C. Rust by check dated
May 4, 1976, and duly accepted and cleared through the banks. Since
anpellant is asserting that interest from payment of his installments
to date of judgment should be at the rate of 8% instead of the statutorily rate of 6% to judgment and Q% thereafter settlement of the balance has not been accomplished, but theB-e-respondents as previously
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indicated have been willing to nay or repay the difference between
the face cf the judgment and the actual total of the appellant's
payments on tne contract.
POINT VI -- A P P E L L A N T KOI ENTITLED 10 ATTORNEY'S F^ISS OR COSTS
IN LoWLR COURT.
Appellant tfarr seeks counsel fees from respondents, but does
not make any allocation as between trie various respondents. Further,
appellant assumes because the Court below permitted or directed return of payments made by the appellant, that he was the prevailing
party.

The opposite view that respondents prevailed, because no

loss-of-bargain damages were awarded by the Court below, is just as
tenable, end, respondents here ^Record /Tr. 6, Rec. ?29/>acknowledged
return of the money was in order. Further, no demand on either of
these resnondents for defense of appellants position was ever made
^Rec. p 75, T78, Tr. 52, 57/
Likewise, costs were discretionary with theuo-irt, and, -rs the
respondents generally prevailed as to the issues, its action in not
awarding any, unless clearly unwarranted, which is not the case here,
should not be, as to lower court items, disturbed.
POINT VII -- iiPPELLANTfS APPRAISAL OF PROPERTY ViiLULo LCT IN
PROXIkllY TO ALLEGED BREACH, '-md APPRAISER NOT
BASING COMPARABLES TO APPROXIMATELY SAi E PRCPKRiT .
The distance of the allegedly comparable tracts used by appellam
witness, Mr. osgooa were aix a mile to two miles awaj from trie tract
invjlvad in tni^ litigation, and, Mr. Osgood, tfhile naving some e>;erience was not a lic?nsed appraiser with the expertise that foes with 1
qualifications required for official licensing.

The appraisal figure

given by respondent's witness wt,re severe,! thousend dollars per acre
less tnan Mr. Osgood's figure /Tr. SjrfRec.

TbiJ
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C £ N C L U S I £ N
In view of all the facts, here, the special warranty clause, both
limiting the respondents1 liability and putting appellant on inquiry
or notice of possible defects, of the title opinion rendered, and
the l'jv, \F to damages, and the lower Courtfs interpretation thereof,
the good faith of the vendors, their agreement to refund payments,
even though their erroneous amounts was based on information furnished to counsel nerein by appellant1s counsel, and, the nature of the
evicence regarding lack of demand for providing a defense for the
ai)pellantfs position, all warrant the general affirmance of the lower
Court's findings end conclusions, and, except for the amount of the
payments made by appellant, should be upheld.
WHEREFOR respondents pray for affirmance of the judgment, decree, and findings, except for adjustment of the enount to be refunded on appellant1 s purchase money pajmerits.
Dated this 9th day of August, A. D. 1976.
Respectfully submitted.
Tfiobert C .""cUmmi'n^:s)7 AtTo7ney~"for~ "~
r e s p o n d e n t s Boyce and Conn&ll.
TRTcku"rd"~s7 Jo^n"son}AtTorney""for
r e s p o n d e n t s Boyce and C o n n e l l .
Received two c o p i e s of t h e f o r e g o i n g B r i e f of Respondents
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for J0SEPH~C7 RUSaTand
David K. ffesterbury of
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